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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE CURBING 
OF CORRUPTION, CRONYISM, NEPOTISM, 
AND FRAUD IN THE EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION 
KELLY LI 
Abstract: The European Commission consists of twenty appointed 
members including a Commission President, and serves primarily as 
a policy initiator and administrator for the European Union. 
Allegations of corruption had long surrounded the Commission and, 
through a series of events, an independent panel of experts was 
charged with the duty of investigating specific allegations of 
corruption. On March 16, 1999, the independent panel issued a 
scathing report of a "sad catalog of negligence and mismanagement" 
by the Commissioners. This report not only identified individual 
instances of mismanagement, cronyism, nepotism, and fraud but also 
excoriated the Commission for lacking "even the slightest sense of 
responsibility." As a result, in an unprecedented and sensational 
move, the entire Commission resigned immediately. The European 
Commission's inherent structure may encourage governmental 
abuses, inefficiency, and corruption, and the author discusses the 
deficiencies of this structure. In light of these deficiencies, the 
author reviews a variety of recommendations posited by the panel of 
independent experts and other critics for increasing accountability 
and preventing corruption. Of these, she concludes that the creation 
of an Independent Prosecutor's Office would be pivotal in the 
curbing of corruption by increasing the efficiency and accountability 
of the Commission. 
INTRODUCTION 
On March 16, 1999, twenty members of the European Commis-
sion (Commission) appointed by the fifteen Member States resigned 
after an independent panel accused the group of chronic cronyism 
and fraud) The document by the independent panel not only 
identified individual instances of mismanagement, cronyism, nepo-
I See Craig R. V,11itney, Grouj) Running Euroj)ean Union Quits en Mass, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
16,1999, allailabli! atLEXIS, News Group File, Most Recent Two Yeal"s. 
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tism, and fraud, but also excoriated the Commission for lacking "even 
the slightest sense of responsibility."2 This Note posits that the struc-
ture of the Commission encourages governmental abuses and sets 
forth recommendations for curbing corruption and revamping the 
Commission in light of the "New Era of Change" that the Commis-
sion's new president, Romano Prodi, pledged upon his appointment.3 
Part I provides the necessary background to understanding cor-
ruption in the Commission. First, it documents the dramatic events 
surrounding the Commission's mass resignation. Second, it describes 
the function of the Commission. Part II outlines the various recom-
mendations for the curbing of corruption, cronyism, nepotism, and 
fraud in the Commission. Finally, Part III explores the effectiveness in 
curbing corruption of one of these recommendations, namely the 
institutionalization of a Prosecutor's office, in light of the inherent 
structural problems of the Commission. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Structure and Function of the Commission 
The Commission is cited as one of the most powerful institutions 
governing the European Union (EU) because of its primary role as 
policy initiator.4 The Commission has a variety of functions that in-
clude: (1) the initiative role, since with few exceptions the Commission 
has the responsibility for initiating legislation; (2) the administrative 
role, in areas such as agriculture, which has been delegated to the 
Commission by the Member States; (3) the narmative role, both as 
guardian of the Treaties and the acquis communautaire (i.e., all the 
Community'S legislation) and as the conscience of the Community in 
proposing ideas and recommendations whether or not covered by the 
Treaties; (4) the mediative role, i.e., mediating among the Member 
States and between the institutions in order to reach agreement and a 
decision; and (5) the representative role, the diplomatic representation 
2 Comm. of Indep. Experts, First Report on Allegations Regarding Fraud, Misman-
agement and Nepotism in the European Commission, at 9.4.25, available at 
http://www.europarl.eu.int/experts/en/reponl.html(Mm". 15, 1999) [hereinafter Fil"st 
Report]. 
3 See Alex Blair, Britain Takes Key Europeall Posts, THE SCOTSMAN, Jllly 10, 1999, available 
at LEXIS, News GrollP File, Most Recent Two Years. 
4 See George A. Bermann, Regulatory Decisioll jHahing ill the European COllllllission, I Co-
LUM. J. EUR. L. 415, 415 (1995); The Role of the COllllllission, available at http://ellropa.ell. 
inti comm/role_en.html (last visited Sept. 30, 1999) [hereinafter Role of the COlllmissioll]. 
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of the Community in third countries and in many international or-
ganizations.5 
The Commission, with its twenty Commissioners and fifteen 
thousand staff members, is the largest of the three primary institu-
tions (in addition to the European Parliament and the Council of 
Ministers) with roughly half of the total employed by all the European 
institutions.6 The Commission consists of a hierarchical structure 
starting with the Commissioners and including one Commission 
President.7 The Commission is divided further into thirty-six Direc-
torates-General (DG) or policy areas headed by a director-general.s A 
director-general, the equivalent to a top civil servant in the govern-
ment ministry, reports directly to the Commissioner in charge of that 
portfolio or policy sector.9 Commissioners typically are responsible 
politically and operationally for one or more DGs.lO Each DG is di-
vided further by subject matter into Directorates and then into Units, 
the departments that generate most of the work.ll In addition, each 
Commissioner has his or her own Cabinet of six individuals who "give 
political support and advice," "help to coordinate policy and mediate 
among competing interests ... and provide a useful lens through 
which to view the intricate and informal processes of Commission pol-
icy making. "12 
The President of the Commission is elected by the EU Heads of 
State or Governments meeting in the European Council, whereas the 
other nineteen Commissioners are nominated by the fifteen Member 
States in agreement with the President.13 The elections of both the 
President and Commissioners require the approval of the European 
Parliament (EP).14 Commissioners serve five-year terms and enjoy re-
markable amounts of stability since no individual can be dismissed,15 
Legislative initiatives typically originate from the Commissioners 
and then are assigned to a director-general.16 The director-general 
5 See GEOFFREY EDWARDS & DAVID SPENCE, THE COMMISSION 4 (1995). 
6 See Role of the Commission, sll/Jm note 4. 
7 See id. 
S See id.; EDWARDS & SPENCE, Sll/Jm note 5, at 97-101. 
9 See Role oflhe Commission, sll/Jm note 4. 
10 See id. 
11 See Bennann, sll/Jm note 4, at 420. 
12 EDWARDS & SPENCE, sUjJm note 5, at 40-44. 
13 See Role of the Commission. sll/lln note 4. 
14 See id. 
15 See EDWARDS & SPENCE, slI/Jm note 5, at 34. 
16 See Bennann, sUjJm note 4, at 421. 
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forms a working party which formulates a Working Document, with 
input from various interest groups, that it thereafter sends to the 
Council of Ministers for commentsP Mter comments and revisions, 
the Council votes on the proposal.18 Over the last few years, the EP 
has received increased power and, in certain legislative areas, the EP 
must be consulted by the working party,19 
B. Events Leading to Resignation 
Some believe that the Commission's mass resignation is "the most 
sensational event in the history of the European Union."20 The events 
leading up to the resignation of the entire Commission, as well as the 
continuing pressures on the Commission, are dramatic and unprece-
dented. 
In December of 1998, Paul van Buitenen, an assistant auditor in 
the Commission's financial control department, handed to the EP a 
thirty page dossier and a carload of evidence documenting rampant 
Commission malpractice. 21 Tales of corruption and mismanagement 
had long been brewing and the EP, traditionally one of the least pow-
erful and most maligned of the EU's institutions, for the first time de-
clined to approve the Commission's budgetary accounts. 22 
Following the refusal, Pauline Green, a member of the EP, put 
forth a censure motion against the Commissioners.23 As a compro-
mise, the EP elected an independent committee of auditors consisting 
of five "Wise Men"-three auditors and two lawyers-who began an 
investigation into a series of specific scandals.24 The investigation 
lasted only three months and sought "to establish to what extent the 
Commission, as a body, or Commissioners individually, bear specific 
responsibility for the recent examples of fraud, mismanagement or 
nepotism raised in parliamentary discussions, or in the allegations 
which have arisen in those discussions. "25 What originally started as an 
17 See CLIYE ARCHER, ORGANIZING EUROPE 118-24 (1994). 
18 See id. at 118. 
19 See id. at 122. 
20 Roy Denman, Europeans Need an /l.ccountable, Efficient COlllmission, INT'L HERALD 
TRIB., May 22, 1999, available at 1999 \VL 511O~~02. 
21 See Kathedne Butler, Europe In Crisis, THE INDEP. (LONDON), Mar. 21, 1999, (Illailable 
at 1999 WL 5990084. 
22 See id. 
23 See Peter Conradi & Stephen Grey, Rlldderless EU Faces Wholesale Shake-Up, SUND. 
TIMES (LONDON), Mar. 21, 1999, available at 1999 WL 144845G6. 
24 See id. 
25 First Report, supra note 2, at 1.1.4. 
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inquiry into specific allegations of corruption raised in Parliamentary 
discussions culminated in a 144-page scathing report of a "sad catalog 
of negligence and mismanagement. "26 
Less than seven hours after the report was released, on March 16, 
1999, the Commission President Jacque SanteI' announced in a press 
conference that all twenty members of the Commission had re-
signed.27 By resigning nine months before the termination of their 
collective five-year term, the Commissioners preempted the highly 
probable EP censure motion. 28 A censure motion would have been 
tantamount to immediate termination, while resignations allowed the 
Commissioners to remain on salary for three additional months and 
also to receive a severance bonus equivalent to three years of salary. 29 
The report examined specific "cases" of fraud, mismanagement, 
cronyism, and nepotism that arose in the course of parliamentary dis-
cussions.3o These included Tourism, MED Programs, ECHO, a youth 
training program called Leonardo da Vinci, the Security Services 
office, Nuclear Safety, and Allegations of Favortism.31 The most sensa-
tional of the corruption scandals charged the Commissioner of Re-
search and Education, Edith Cresson, of nepotism through her hiring 
of her dentist to write reports on AIDS research for a large salary.32 
The dentist, who lived and traveled extensively with her using public 
expense, lacked qualifications for the post and allegedly was unable to 
perform his job due to illness.33 In addition, Ms. Cresson frequently 
wrote herself checks from the Leonardo da Vinci youth program for 
26 Conradi & Grev, supra note 23. 
27 See James Graff, A Eummassacre, TIME MAG., Mar. 29, 1999, available at 1999 \\1. 
15940661. 
28 See John Lallghland, \'ie1l1Joint: The Rascals are Cm,/Jing Barh. THE EXPRESS, May 7, 
1999, available 011999 "''L 5816762. 
29 See id. 
30 Set' First Report, supra note 2, at 1.1.2. 
31 See generally id. "MED programmes for decentralised cooperation with the countries 
of the MeditelTanean began in 1992 after the Gulf ""ar with Iraq. Their aim was to 
strengthen political and economic cooperation with the southern Meditenanean coun-
tries in order to counterbalance the aid given to the cOlin tries of Central and Eastern 
Europe." First Report, s1l/))'a note 2, at 3.1.1. "ECHO, the 'European Comlllllnity Humani-
tarian Office' was set up on 1 March 1992 to give the European Community a more spe-
cialised and effective means for providing aid in emergency relief situations." /d. at 4.1.1. 
The Leonardo da Vinci p1'ogram was responsible for matters concerning education, train-
ing and youth. See id. at 5.2.1. 
32 See Butler, supra note 21. 
33 See id. 
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no documented reason.34 Furthermore, the report charged Jacques 
Santer with negligence in his responsibilities as Commissioner of Se-
curity Service by allowing a "state within a state" to develop.35 Security 
Service functions were outsourced without any form of oversight and, 
thus, the firm that received the contract fixed parking tickets for 
Commissioners, passed out jobs improperly, and even kept tabs on 
individuals who spoke to internal auditors.36 Other charges included 
that of Emma Bonino, the Commissioner who misused 2.4 million 
euros from her Africa and Bosnia "humanitarian aid" budgets and 
misplaced 600,000 euros, as well as that of Manuel Marin, the Com-
missioner in charge of the MED program who engaged in false con-
tracts, theft, and favoritism. 37 Finally, the report is replete with charges 
that many individuals hired brother-in-Iaws and friends while others 
granted contracts to favorites. 38 
The panel of experts did not find cases where a Commissioner 
directly and personally committed fraud or gained financially from 
any corruption.39 The panel, however, did find "instances where 
Commissioners or the Commission as a whole bore responsibility for 
instances of fraud, irregularities or mismanagement in their services 
or areas of special responsibility."40 Most of the panel's charges related 
to general mismanagement resulting from policies initiated with 
knowledge that they would be understaffed.41 Because the Commis-
sion was understaffed, many of the daily responsibilities were outsour-
ced but with nominal oversight or forethought by the Commissioners 
and, thus, waste, fraud, and corruption burgeoned.42 The independ-
ent panel ultimately concluded, "It is becoming difficult to find any-
one who has even the slightest sense of responsibility. "43 
By September 1999, President Prodi was designated Commission 
President and, in April 1999, the nineteen other Commissioners were 
31 See Will SOll/eone Please Stand Up, THE BULL., Mar. 30, 1999, available at 1999 WL 
2274219. 
35 GI'aff, supra note 27. 
36 See id. 
37 See Laughland, supra note 28. 
38 See First Report, supra note 2, at 8.1-8.6. 
39 See id. at 9.2.3. 
·10 Id. 
41 See Michael Berendt, EIlID/Jean Scandal, CMA MGMT. ACCT. MAG., JUlie 1, 1999, 
available at 1999 WL 14113310; Richard Watson, Europe's Rising Tide of Fraud, PUB. FIN .. 
JUlie 4, 1999, available at 1999 WL 15502617. 
42 See First Report. supra note 2, at 9.2.7; Berendt, supra note 41. 
43 First Report, supra lIote 2, at 9.4.25. 
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nominated and approved by Prodi and the EP, respectively.44 Four out 
of the twenty former Commissioners emerged from the inquiries un-
scathed and were reelected.45 Ironically, these reelected individuals, 
though "innocent" of fraud, mismanagement, and corruption, still 
benefited from resigning by cashing in on their severance bonuses.46 
Both President Prodi and Neil Kinnock, a surviving Commissioner 
from the clean-up who was elevated to vice president of administrative 
reform, vowed that there would be "zero tolerance" for corruption 
and also a "continual and insistent emphasis on efficiency, transpar-
ency and accountability. "47 
In September 1999, the committee of "Wise Men" issued a follow-
up report focusing on internal reform of "financial procedures, con-
trol mechanisms, personnel management, [and] measures aimed at 
combating fraud. "48 The report cited that the entire legal framework 
for fighting against fraud was incoherent and incomplete and must be 
overhauled.49 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Reasons for Corruption 
The Commission's structure encourages governmental abuses, 
inefficiency, and corruption because it provides insufficient demo-
cratic accountability within its inherent structure.50 The Commission's 
deficiencies range from an absence of sufficient checks and balances 
to general structural flaws such as the lack of individual oversight and 
44 St'e John Rossant, Europe's Fitst P!illlt' Ministt'l; Bus. WK., Sept. 27, 1999, aliailablR at 
1999 \\L 27295205. 
45 See Prodi's People, TIMES (LONDON), July 15, 1999, available at LEXIS, News Group 
File, Most Recent Two Years. 
46 St'e Laughland, sllpra note 28. 
47 Stephen Castle, Kinnock FOlliS to Clean Out Brussi'll SllYIu, THE INDEP. (LONDON), Sept. 
10, 1999, at 2, aliailablR at LEXIS, News Group File, Most Recent Two Years; see Martin 
Fletcher, Burt/fJY Starlfor Kif/noch's Big Clean-UjJ, TIl\IES (LONDON), Sept. 8,1999, available at 
LEXIS, News Group File, Most Recent Two Years. 
48 Comlll. of lndep. Experts, Second Report on Reform of the COlJlmission-Analysis 
of Current Practice and Proposals for Tackling Mismanagement, Irregularities and Fraud, 
Vol. I, at 1.1.2-1.1.4, OlJailable at http://www.europarl.eu.int/experts (Sept. 9,1999) [here-
inafter Second Report]. 
49 Set'id. at 5.14.1. 
50 See Peter L. Lindseth, Dt'lIlocratic Legitimacy and tlit' Administrative Character ofSuprana-
tionalism: The Examplt' of the Ellmjll'an Comlllllility, 99 COLUM. L. RE\,. 628, G28 (1999). 
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accountability, weak democratic oversight by the EP, and a weak insti-
tutionalized fraud-busting program.51 
1. Lack of Individual Oversight and Accountability 
This system does not make the individual Commissioners ac-
countable.52 The bureaucratic layering ensures that the Commission-
ers can easily shirk responsibility and that it is difficult to uncover 
what transpires.53 Each Commissioner is insulated from enacting the 
policies that the Commission puts forth first by his or her Cabinet, 
then by the director-general, then by the staff.54 Moreover, since the 
Commission is understaffed, much of the work is outsourced, which 
further removes those involved from the oversight of the policy initia-
tives.55 
Another factor that contributes to corruption is the "psychologi-
cal gap" between the twenty Commissioners and the Directorates-
General that form the European civil service.56 Commissioners feel 
responsible for policy but not for administration and, thus, do not 
feel obliged to resolve the issues; instead, they duck under criticisms 
of administrative failures. 57 
Changes have been installed to amend the situation, such as the 
Amsterdam Treaty, enacted in June 1997, which was an instrumental 
attempt at instilling accountability among the EU institutions by in-
creasing the role of the President in overseeing the Commissioners.58 
First, the President of the Commission gained the power to veto the 
51 See Andrew Gumbel, The Satllrday Profile: Romano Prodi, President Elect of the Ellropean 
Comlllissioll: it Gentlelllall Among TltilYlles, THE INDEP., Apr. 17, 1999, (Illailable at LEXIS, News 
Group File, Most Recent Two Years. 
52 See First Report, sllpra note 2, at 9.4.1; Francesca E. Bignami, The Democratic Deficit in 
Ellropean COIIII/lUnity RlIle,"!aldng: A Call For Notice al/d Comment ill Comitology, 40 HARV. INT'L 
LJ. 451, 452 (1999). 
53 See Recycling Cars, Scrapping Delllocracy, WALL ST. j. EUR., Jul. 26, 1999, available at 
1999 WL-WSJE 18409978 [hereinafter Recycii ng Cars J. 
54 See First Report, sllpra note 2, at 9.3.4; Thomas Christiansen, A lHatul'illg Bureauc-
racy?, in EUR. UNION POWER AND POLICY MAKING, 84-85 (Jeremy Richardson ed., 1996). 
55 See First Report, supra note 2, at 9.2.7; Berendt, supra note 41. Much of the criticism, 
such as in the MED case, ECHO, Leonardo, Security, Nudem' Safety, involved "underre-
sourcing ... [and thus J the need to delegate public-sector responsibilities to outside con-
sultants." See First Report, supra note 2, at 9.2.4-9.2.9. 
56 See Berendt, sllj}/'a note 41. 
57 See irl. 
58 See The ClwllRnge Awaiting ROlllano Prodi, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 3, 1999, available at 
1999 \\'L 7362332; Keeping the EC Clean, THE ASIAN WALL ST. j., May 11, 1999, available at 
1999 WL-WSJA 5433274. 
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appointees of the Member States.59 Second, the President gained the 
power to remove portfolios from individual Commissioners if they 
failed to adequately manage those portfolios.60 The enlarged role of 
the President was intended to strengthen the executive position and 
to establish a leader who was willing to take responsibility and could 
keep individuals accountable.61 The mass resignations illuminate the 
need for the President to expand his powers and to increase oversight 
and accountability.62 
2. Weak Democratic Oversight by EP 
The existence of the EP is meant to provide a democratic check 
against the Commission; however, democratic scrutiny does not playa 
vital role in formulation of policy.63 The EP is the only directly elected 
body of members.64 Elections are held every five years in each Mem-
ber State according to nationallaws.65 Although the EP is the closest 
thing to a democracy, "the standard complaint is that the only directly 
elected body, the European Parliament, does not have sufficient legis-
lative power and cannot adequately control the Community's execu-
tive process. "66 Moreover, election turn-outs have been extremely low 
and, thus, do not nearly represent the populous.67 During the July 
1999 elections, a mere fifty-percent turned out, perhaps voicing their 
disenchantment over the government due to the mass resignation.68 
In the successive Luxembourg, Maastricht, and Amsterdam Trea-
ties, the EU governments have expanded the powers of the EP.69 The 
59 See Keeping the EC Clean, wpm note 58. 
60 See id. 
61 See id. 
62 See id. 
63 See D.WID M. WOOD & BIROLA A. YESILADA. THE EMERGIN(~ EUROPEAN UNION 112-
13 (1996); Recycling Cars, wjna note 53. 
64 See WOOD & YESIL4.DA, sll/Jm note 63, at 112-113; Bignami. slI/Jra note 45. 
65 See NICHOLAS MOUSSIS. ACCESS TO EUROPEAN UNION 56-59 (1997). 
66 Bignami, slI/Jra note 52. at 452. 
67 See Peter Norman, Low \'Ote ,Way See Less Abmsilw Assnllbl)" FIN. TIMES (LONDON) ,june 
14,1999, available al LEXIS, News Group File, Most Recent Two Years. 
68 See id. 
69 See David Earnshaw & Da\'id judge, From Co-ojJemtioll to Co-riecisio II , in EUR. UNION 
POWER AND POLICY MAKING 96-125 (jeremy Richardson ed., 199G); WOOD & YESILADA, 
su/na note 63, at 100-O:~; KeejJillg tlU' EC Clean, sll/Jm note 58; Little Respect, Less Love, But 
Gmwing Pown; THE ECONOMIST, june 12, 1999, available at 1999 WL 7363411 [he1'einafter 
Little Respect]. 
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EP has the authority to amend legislation in many areas, reject treaties 
and the EU budget, as well as veto the Commission's appointments. 7o 
3. Weak Institutionalized Fraud Busting Programs 
The Commission's fraud investigation department was called the 
Unite de Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Fraud (UCLFA).71 Tradition-
ally, the UCLFA was weak and had limited powers to investigate allega-
tions of fraud brought against the Commissioners.72 Two months after 
the mass resignation, however, in July 1999, the Commission, along 
with the EP and Council of Ministers, adopted Regulation 
1073/99/EC governing the establishment of the Office pour la Lutte 
Anti-Fraud (OLAF).73 The statute replaces UCLFA with OLAF and 
defines the broadened scope, procedures, and rules of OLAF's inves-
tigations, as well as the rights of those concerned.74 Most importantly, 
it lays out the rules for civil servants under investigation.75 OLAF is an 
independent department that investigates allegations of fraud, cor-
ruption, and mismanagement.76 
At the same time, as the Independent Experts noted in the Sec-
ond Report, the UCLFA, now OLAF, does not have much strength 
because it is an ineffective organization with limited powers.77 It can 
do little other than refer the allegations to each Member State's po-
lice.7s The police, in turn, fail to understand the complexity of EU-
wide fraud, assign it low priority, and fail to coordinate investiga-
tions.79 
70 See Little Res/Ject. supra note 69. 
71 See Second Report, supra note 48, at 5.4. 
n See iri. at 5.9.5. The weaknesses include 1) weak policy on organizational arrange-
ments for inquiries, 2) incorrectly implemented security measures and procedures, 3) 
insufficient permanent agents, 4) inoperational and inetfective electronic databases, 4) 
inadequate management and handling of case file information, and 5) difficulties in 
UClAF cooperation with Member States. See id. 
73 See COl/lmission Amends Statute of Anti-Fraud Office, EUR. REp., July 3, 1999, available at 
1999 WL 8306305 [hereinafter COl/lmission All/ends Statute]. 
H See id. 
75 See id. 
76 See id. 
i7 See Second Report, sllpra note 48, at 5.9.5-5.9.9 & 5.14.1. For an assessment of 
OlAF, see generally iel., at 5.11. 
78 See COlllmission Amends Statute, silpra note 7,t 
79 See GeoffWinestock, Naming of EU Fraud Prosecutor Ulged, WALL ST.]. EUR., Sept. 13, 
1999, available at 1999 WL-WSJE 18413597; see also Gel't Vermelllen, A Judicial COlll/te/part 
for Europol: Should the European UI/ion Establish a NeillIOIi< of Prosecutil/g al/d II/vestigatil/g 
Officials?, 2 UCLA]. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 225, 225 (l997) (al'glling for coordination of 
network of Membel' State police through est<lhlishmenl of cenlralulIil). 
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B. Proposed Recommendations To Curb Corruption 
Many critics are calling for a m~or overhaul of the institutions 
and procedures.8o The Second Report generated by the Independent 
Panel also proposes extensive recommendations.81 The following 
paragraphs detail the recommendations to curb corruption and in-
crease accountability in the Commission, as derived from the Second 
Report as well as from various critics.82 
1. Increased Accountability and Transparency 
Individual accountability can be increased through a variety of 
methods. First, the President's ability to fire individual Commissioners 
would increase individual responsibility as compared to the current 
system of censuring the entire Commission.83 Second, reducing the 
number of Commissioners and making the Commissioners more re-
sponsible for the operations of policies would also increase account-
ability by focusing the Commissioners and reducing red-tape.84 Fur-
thermore, transparency would increase accountability by breaking the 
"culture of secrecy" which magnifies the opportunities for corruption 
and mismanagement.85 A more effective press and information policy 
would increase transparency and, consequently, accountability.86 
In addition, the institutionalization of tougher fraud investigative 
powers are required for investigative, punitive, and deterrent effects.87 
VVhistle blower laws also would open the door inside the Commis-
sion.88 Currently, there does not seem to be any protection afforded 
whistle blowers as evidenced by the treatment of Paul van Buitenen, 
the financial analyst who came forward with a dossier of allegations of 
80 See Recycling Cars, supra note 53. "It will take a cultural reyoilltion at the heart of the 
Commission to change llIany of the practices and expectations "'hich haye made it a hlln-
bering out of control bureaucracy where nationality counts more than merit and where 
cronyism is a fact of life." Butler, sujJra note 21. 
81 See Second Report, sujJra note 48, at ch. 2. 
82 Sl'e id.; Christiansen, sujnG note 54, at 85-91. 
83 See Denman, slljJra note 20; \"illiam Echikson, Rl'IlIalil' till' ECfrolll till' TOj} Down, Bus. 
WK., Apr. 5, 1999, availablR at 1999 WL 8226799;Julie Smith, TWl'ntl' HOl/l'st Men (or Homen), 
WORLD TODAY, Aug. I, 1999, availabh? at 1999 WL 12485452. 
84 See Christiansen, supra note 54, at 90-91; Echikson, sujnG note 83. 
85 Sl'e Barry James, Ethical Laxity Undl'l'IlIines EU EXl'Clltille Body, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,JlIly 
23, 1999, atJailable at 1999 WL 5112678. 
86 See id . 
. 87 See Com mOils Hams of Nl'ed for TOllghl'1' Fraud Probes, FIN. TiMES (LONDON), Aug. 25, 
1999, available at LEXIS, News Group File, Most Recellt Two Years. 
88 Sel'Second RepOI't, sllj!ra note 48, at 7.6.8-7.G.11;James, suj}/G note 85. 
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fraud. 89 Mr. Buitenen was suspended on half-pay and was charged with 
breaking confidentiality rules.90 Currently, he is employed in a de-
partment ordering furniture and supervising building cOlltracts.91 
2. Strengthening the EP and OLAF 
There is a need for more democratic accountability.92 Since the 
EP is the only institution that provides democratic accountability, its 
role and powers should be increased.93 As conferred by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam [Treaty] effective on May 1, 1999, the EP's co-decision 
role has been expanded so that it, along with the Council of Ministers 
and the Commission, jointly shapes issues related to the environment, 
social policy, health and consumer protection, freedom to provide 
services, and the free movement of workers.94 Strengthening the EP 
would further ensure democratic legitimacy.95 Allowing the EP to 
elect the President is another remedy.96 
At the same time, the EP's effectiveness as a democratic check 
must be called into question given the below fifty percent electoral 
turn out in June 1999.97 Many critics have claimed that the EP is also 
corrupt, which further keeps citizens from participating.98 
Furthermore, the Second Report recommends strengthening 
OLAF, the European fraud investigation office.99 On July 1,1999, two 
months after the mass resignation, the Commission already had in-
creased OLAF's powers through the adoption of an amendment that 
enshrines the principles for internal investigations. loo However, more 
needs to be done to increase the effectiveness of OLAF, such as ensur-
ing supervision and independence of OLAF. 101 
89 See Stephen Bates, EU Fails To Halt Book By Man Who Revealed Frauds, THE GUARDIAN 
(LONDON), Oct. 13, 1999, available at LEXIS, News Group File, Most Recent Two Years. 
90 See id. 
91 See id. 
92 See Butler, supra note 21; Recycling Cars, supra note 53. 
93 See Lindseth, supra note 50, at 672-77. 
94 See Business PI"Ppares for Nl'111 EU Parlialllent with Teeth, FIN. TIMES (LONDON) ,June 10, 
1999 available at LEXIS, News Group File, Most Recent Two Years. 
95 See Butler, supra note 21. 
96 See id. 
97 See Bignami, supra note 43, at 462-68; Norman, sll/Jra note 67. 
98 See Smith, supra note 83. 
99 See Second Report, supra note 48, at 5.6. 
100 See Commission A.mends Statute, sllpra note 73. 
101 See Second Report, slljml note 48, at 5.11-5.12. 
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3. EU Public Prosecutor's Office 
Another potential remedy is to institutionalize an independent 
EU Public Prosecutor's Office, which would have full power to inves-
tigate allegations.102 "An EU public prosecutor's office should be de-
signed to provide the necessary competence to present criminal cases 
relating to EU fraud throughout the Union, while leaving the jurisdic-
tion of national courts untouched and without implying any funda-
mental effects on national legal systems. "103 This suggestion has arisen 
not only from the panel of independent experts, but also from the 
Commission's own proposals for establishing a uniform code of 
criminal offences relating to fraud, otherwise known as Corpus Ju-
riS.104 
The central EU Public Prosecutor (EPP) would be independent 
of the EU institutions, supported by a network of prosecutors within 
the national systems, and would work alongside OlAF to investigate 
and prosecute offences within national courts. 105 The prosecutor 
would hold "unrestricted jurisdiction" for offences committed by 
members of EU organizations and work through national prosecution 
offices for EU offences and refer prosecutions to "appropriate na-
tional courtS."106 "The legal basis would be Article 29 of the Treaty ('to 
provide citizens with a high level of safety within an area of freedom, 
security and justice,') Article 34 (which provides for framework deci-
sions on legal cooperation or Treaties which enter into force as soon 
as half of the signatory states have ratified them) and Article 280 (on 
protecting the financial interests of the EU). "107 The prosecutor 
102 See id. at 5.12.10-5.12.12. 
103M. at 5.12.11. 
\04 See Second Report, slljml note 48. at 5.12.13-5.12.17;John Mason. Peers Oiticize Pro-
posals to Fight Fmud Against Ell, FIN. TIMES (LONDON). Mav 31, 1999. at 8. available at 
LEXIS. News Group File, Most Recent Two Years. Corpus Juris sets up a single legal area 
covering all of the EU over which the EPP would have jurisdiction. It allows for CI'OSS bor-
der prosecution. detention. alTests, and investigation and is the "embryo of a future Euro-
pean Criminal Code." See hi.; see also. Michael Shrimpton, Freedolll's Flame Flickel'S. TIMES 
(LONDON), Mar. 23, 1999, atlaitable at 1999 WL 7981916. 
105 See Second Report. sujJm note 48, at 5.12.10-5.12.12. 
106 Id.; see Michael Smith and Emma Tucker, Elf }.IlIst Set lit) Prosecution Office To Tachle 
Fraud. FIN. TIMES (LONDON). Sept. 11, 1999, at 2, available at LEXIS. News GI'OUp File, 
Most Recent Two Years. 
\07 EllTOpean COif/mission: Independent ExjJel'ls Looh into ElIrojleml COllllllission Shortcomings. 
EUR. REp., Sept. 11. 1999, allailflble 011999 WL 8306916. 
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would be solely accountable to an independent board with a strong 
parliamentary constituency and could only be fired by this board. lOB 
III. ANALYSIS: BENEFITS OF ESTABLISHING AN INDEPENDENT 
PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
The charges that brought upon the mass resignation of the 
Commission herald the need for institutional changes.l09 Most of the 
charges involve the Commissioners' negligent administration of poli-
cies, favoritism in allocation of contracts and in employment deci-
sions, and also oversight of allegations of fraud or irregularities. llo 
This type of deficient and ineffective administration not only hampers 
the functioning of effective government but also increases the poten-
tial for fraud. m Thus, the prevention of fraud, along with other 
changes, is a necessary component of any systemic change.1l2 
The Independent Experts' primary recommendation for combat-
ing fraud was the institutionalization of an independent Public Prose-
cutor's Office.l13 The Public Prosecutor's Office would be imple-
mented in three stages.1l4 Stage One would include the appointment 
of an independent public prosecutor.1l5 Stage Two would include the 
creation in each Member State of a national Prosecution Office for 
European Offences (POEO), and Stage Three would include the 
creation of a single, indivisible European Prosecution Office.I16 
When analyzing the effectiveness of creating an Independent 
Public Prosecutor's Office in light of the structural weaknesses enu-
merated above, the benefits must be examined. First, the prosecutor 
must have the power to investigate allegations and individuals to a 
much greater extent. ll7 The prosecutor also must have the ability to 
use the resources of the Prosecutor's Office in the individual Member 
States, as well as the aid of the individual police forces if further inves-
108 See EU to Set up Fraudbuster in Drive to Clean Image, FIN. TIMES (LONDon), May 25, 
1999, at 3, available at LEXIS, News Gmup File, Most Recent Two Years [hereinafter EU to 
Set liP Fraudlmster]. 
109 See COli/mission Amends Statute, supra note 73. 
llO See First Report, supra note 2, at 9.2.3. 
III See Second Report, mpra note 48, at 5.1-5.2. 
ll2 See id. at 5.2.1. 
113 See id. at 5.12-5.14. 
ll4 See id. at 5.14.8. 
115 See Second Report, sllpra note 48, at 5.14.8. 
ll6 See id. 
117 See id. at 5.13.3-5.13.7. 
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tigation becomes necessary. us This system is far superior to the lim-
ited UCLFA system, where allegations were delegated to the Member 
State's police forces for further investigation.u9 The difficulty in dele-
gation was that Member States' police units were not knowledgeable 
regarding the complex laws and were not particularly interested in 
cases that were delegated without supervision or direction. 120 
Moreoyer, the establishment of a Prosecutor's Office may in-
crease the likelihood of accountability among the Commissioners.121 
The Prosecutor's Office should publicize all of its infonnation-inves-
tigations and findings-thereby increasing the accountability of the 
Commissioners by informing the public of possible misappropria-
tions.122 Exposure to the public throughout Europe as well as to a neg-
lige:nt Commissioner's Member State constituency would likely be a 
strong deterrent against corrupt behavior.123 
Although the Prosecutor's Office might overreach, the prosecu-
tor would be accountable to a board, heavily composed of parliamen-
tary members; thus, democratic accountability would be increased.124 
In sum, the Prosecutor's Office would be a vital check against fraud 
and corruption in a system that inherently lacks the systemic checks 
and balances that are necessary to ensure accountability.125 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission's mass resignation mandates a closer look at the 
presence of corruption and mismanagement. Such an examination 
reveals the inherent deficiency in the European Commission's struc-
ture. The lack of sufficient checks and balances to ensure accountabil-
ity and prevent corruption helped to foster the types of behavior that 
resulted in the ouster of the Commissioners. Three categorical weak-
nesses can be derived from the incidences: lack of individual account-
ability, lack of democratic oversight, and weak institutionalized fraud 
investigation programs. The panel of Independent Experts and other 
critics have proposed a variety of recommendations. Of these, the 
creation of an Independent Prosecutor's Office, working along with 
liB See id. 
119 See Second Report, slt/Jm note 48, at 5.9.5. 
120 See id.: Winestock, sll/Jm note 79. 
121 See Smith, supra note 83. 
122 See id. 
123 See id. 
124 See Ell to Set up Fmlldbusll'1; slljJm note 108. 
125 Second Repon, sujJra note 48, at 5.12-5.14. 
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OLAF, would be pivotal in the curbing of corruption by increasing the 
efficiency and accountability of the Commission. With these changes, 
the Commission may well be on its way to the "New Era of Change" 
promised by the Commission.126 
126 Blair, supra note 3. 
